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There is a widespread belief among Americans that the nation’s political system 
suffers from dysfunction.  It is, therefore, worth asking whether the Constitution has been 
complicit in contributing to the perceived political dysfunction.  Does the United States, 
in effect, suffer from constitutional dysfunction?  
 I conclude that political and societal developments subsequent to the Founding 
have retooled and repurposed American governing institutions, rendering their function 
antithetical to the original design of the Constitution.  The long-term and collective 
effects of these changes may contribute to contemporary constitutional dysfunction. 
 At the outset, I discuss general purposes and functions of constitutions.  By 
describing constitutional functionality, we can better grasp the nature of when 
constitutions work and when they fail to function.  As such, we will be best equipped to 
not only design a metric by which to measure constitutional dysfunction, but to apply this 
rubric to the American regime.  “Chapter Two” will detail the framing of the American 
Constitution and explore the principles undergirding its creation.  “Chapter Three” will 
cover the so-called “unfounding,” the processes and developments which have changed 
the character of governing institutions.  “Chapter Four” will focus on proposed solutions 
which may be both misguided and potentially problematic.  Finally, “Chapter Five” will 
consider the best approach to addressing American constitutional dysfunction.   
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CHAPTER ONE: ANATOMIZING DYSFUNCTION AND DESIGNING A METRIC 
 
A recent survey conducted by Pew Research found that fully 76% of Americans polled 
believed that their leaders in Washington were unable to address the most important issues facing 
the nation.  Such a failure of governance was viewed as harmful to the welfare of the country by 
a similar percentage.1  Similarly, a Gallup poll conducted at the same time showed that a 
plurality of Americans, around 18%, rated government leadership or lack thereof, as their top 
concern.2  There is a widespread belief among Americans that the nation’s political system 
suffers from dysfunction.  It is, therefore, worth asking whether the Constitution has been 
complicit in contributing to the perceived political dysfunction.  Does the United States, in 
effect, suffer from constitutional dysfunction?  
 I conclude that political and societal developments subsequent to the Founding have 
retooled and repurposed American governing institutions, rendering their function antithetical to 
the original design of the Constitution.  The long-term and collective effects of these changes 
may contribute to contemporary constitutional dysfunction. 
 It is first useful to discuss the general purposes and functions of constitutions.   By 
describing constitutional functionality, we can better grasp the nature of when constitutions work 
and when they fail to function.  As such, we will be best equipped to not only design a metric by 
which to measure constitutional dysfunction, but to apply this rubric to the American regime.  
“Chapter Two” will detail the framing of the American Constitution and the principles 
undergirding its creation.  “Chapter Three” will cover the so-called “unfounding,” the processes 
and developments which have changed the character of governing institutions.  “Chapter Four” 																																																								
1	“Few	See	Quick	Cure	for	Nation’s	Political	Divisions,”	Pew	Research	Center,	December	11,	2014,	accessed	March	
7,	2016,	URL:	http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/11/few-see-quick-cure-for-nations-political-divisions/.		
2	Lydia	Saad,	“Cluster	of	Concerns	Vie	for	Top	U.S.	Problem	in	2014,”	Gallup,	January	2,	2015,	accessed	March	7,	
2016,	URL:	http://www.gallup.com/poll/180398/cluster-concerns-vie-top-problem-2014.aspx.		
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will focus on proposed solutions which may be both misguided and potentially problematic.  
“Chapter Five” will consider the best approach to addressing American constitutional 
dysfunction.   
 
1.1  Constitutional Purpose and Functionality 
 Different types of Constitutions exist around the world.  While the English Constitution is 
unwritten, having gradually established a constitutional framework through a series of successive 
legislative action, constitutions are often written texts codifying laws and other legal stipulations.  
They are crafted to achieve specific purposes for the nation.  At their most basic, they establish a 
framework for government, specifying the mechanisms and institutions that operate in the state.  
Constitutions outline these schematics “by establishing the rules for determining who makes the 
law, setting out the processes by which those governing officials make laws, and limiting the 
laws those governing officials enact.”3  
 In order for lawmaking and enforcement bodies to operate, constitutions must identify a 
proper allocation of authority.  To that end, they authorize governing institutions with the 
requisite degree and type of power, thereby affording legitimacy to their actions.  As Graber 
suggests, “The absence of a constitution would result … in an anarchic state where no one has 
any legal authority.”  Further, by empowering these bodies, constitutions may, at times 
“simultaneously … constrain government,” withholding powers not specifically granted by the 
text.4  However, these limitations may not always have the desired effect of restricting 
government, especially when their meaning is vague and given to broader interpretation.        
																																																								
3	Mark	A.	Graber,	A	New	Introduction	to	American	Constitutionalism,	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	
25.	
4	Ibid.,	46.	
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 Additionally, constitutionalism embodies the idea that “ordinary law,” or legislative 
statutes, ought to remain separate and distinct from the “fundamental law” of the text.5  While 
legislatures may be granted significant powers to decide policy for the nation, they are not 
permitted to violate the precepts and principles of the constitution, nor alter the text itself.  By 
elevating the fundamental law over the ordinary law, constitutionalism “endeavors to divorce 
fundamental substantive and procedural decisions about the good from the human impulse to 
think self-interestedly.”6  Thus, constitutions provide long-term security and stability in the face 
of future uncertainty.   
 Simply stated, constitutions seek to offer clarity and certainty to the polity, whether it is 
by ordering the political framework of government, empowering and limiting the powers of that 
government, or providing a distinction between statutory law and constitutional law.  
Collectively, these objectives establish effective governing institutions which create and execute 
laws.  In so doing, they offer legitimacy to the regime and assure stability for its institutions.   
 Although constitutions share general purposes, they must be appropriately tailored to the 
societies they serve.  The peculiarities and particularities of varying nations, as well as nations 
with varying backgrounds, will demand that each constitution possess a unique character.  No 
single solution could possibly succeed in achieving legitimacy and stability for such widely 
disparate societies and circumstances.  In addition to reflecting their societies, constitutions may 
serve “to form collective public identities [and] shape a country’s public character.”7  By 
offering “clearly defined aims or goals,” they can “cultivate imagined political communities.”8  
In other words, constitutions, if framed effectively, can act as a unifying force for its citizens, 																																																								
5	Beau	Breslin,	From	Words	to	Worlds:	Exploring	Constitutional	Functionality,	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	
University	Press,	2009),	21.	
6	Ibid.,	20.	
7	Breslin,	From	Words	to	Worlds,	4.	
8	Ibid.,	15.	
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drawing upon the diverse identities and aspirations of its people and strengthening societal 
cohesion.  
 To that end, certain nations may find it suitable to include in their constitutions an 
enumeration of rights deemed so essential they are deserved of particular attention and 
protection.  The Constitution of the United States contains a supplementary Bill of Rights which 
was approved several years after the Constitution’s ratification.  It is a list of negative rights, 
spaces which ought to be removed from the reach of the national government.  Oftentimes, 
polities will adopt constitutions with positive rights, or obligations of the national government to 
its people.  For example, South Africa’s constitution enshrines the need for education and health 
care.9		These services require a more active and extensive government.      
 To achieve these purposes, an effective and functional political system must exist.  
Therefore, constitutional functionality is, in essence, the degree to which the constitution’s 
general purposes and specific ideals are attained.  A constitution “imagines a normative political 
society … and then, if successful, it helps to bring about that envisioned community,” writes 
Breslin.10  Further, constitutional texts may “design the various political institutions of the 
community in a self-conscious way … so as to achieve the polity’s expressed objectives.”11  As 
such, they outline the processes, mechanisms and objectives in realizing the nation’s broader 
goals.  
 A functional constitution begets a functional political system.  In order to achieve its 
constitutional purposes, a functional political system must be comprised of vibrant governing 
branches to provide dependability that they will operate effectively; a commitment on behalf of 																																																								
9	“A	Bill	of	Rights	for	a	New	South	Africa,”	African	National	Congress:	South	Africa’s	National	Liberation	Movement,	
accessed	March	7,	2016,	URL:	http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231.		
10	Breslin,	From	Words	to	Worlds,	47.	
11	Ibid.,	69.	
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political actors to a proper balance of powers to ensure the protection of rights, liberties, and 
other prerogatives of the people; and a guarantee that the fundamental law of the constitution is 
neither endangered by the statutory decisions of the legislature nor the popular vote of the 
people, thereby assuring  long-term security.  Societal cohesion and unity are achieved when the 
citizenry is engaged and active to ensure their interests are represented and their legitimacy is 
afforded to the regime, but limited to the extent that stability and durability are secured.   
As mentioned, education and health care are important services enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights of South Africa.  Therefore, constitutional functionality is the extent to which these rights, 
among others, are provided to their people by the state.  The Parliament is sanctioned by the 
constitution with the necessary powers to determine the best policies in distributing these 
services.  Therefore, an operational, coherent, and vigorous legislature is required.  Once these 
services are provided to the nation without impairment, the reliability of and satisfaction for the 
state is enhanced, thereby strengthening its legitimacy with society and long-term stability.    
Having discussed what constitutions are for and how they operate, it is now necessary to 
examine when they fail to function properly.      
 
1.2  Constitutional Dysfunction 
 If constitutional functionality is the degree to which the nation’s purposes are achieved, 
then constitutional dysfunction is rooted in the failure of the system to realize its higher goals via 
constitutionally-sanctioned methods.  In other words, the institutions and mechanisms 
themselves impair the attainment of the constitution’s purposes.  At times, dysfunction may 
involve the disruption of institutions by other factors, but isolating the purely constitutional 
aspects can get tricky since certain forces may be extra-constitutional, emanating from other 
	 6	
sectors of the polity.  Nonetheless, this is constitutional dysfunction at its most basic.  It 
manifests in different forms, and as such, is subject to vastly different interpretations.   
 Therefore, to understand constitutional dysfunction, it is worth discussing what it does 
not involve.  One misperception is that the presence and persistence of conflict is emblematic of 
a constitution’s dysfunction.  However, constitutions do not eliminate conflict, nor should they.  
By contrast, they are “supposed to manage conflict in a way that ensures regime stability.”12  As 
Breslin explains, conflict is spawned in the “absence of clearly defined rules,” when uncertainty 
in the questions of governance arise.13  Constitutions should promote “constructive conflict,” 
those debates and discussions which can “advance the promises laid out in the text’s preamble,” 
while minimizing “destructive conflict.”14  Therefore, constitutional dialogue, the process of 
defining and refining the limits of state power and extent of societal protections, strengthens the 
legitimacy and stability of the constitutional order. 
  Additionally, it is worth cautioning that the presence of political and institutional conflict 
is not symptomatic of a constitutional crisis.  Graber, minimizing the role of conflict in 
constitutional crises, argues that such crises “do not occur merely because people disagree, 
perhaps very strongly, about the meaning of constitutional provisions.”  Instead, “serious crises 
are rooted in the constitutional failure to construct politics in ways that create tolerable solutions 
to constitutional disagreements or to constitute citizens willing to live within constitutional 
norms.”15  These instruments of conflict management may include providing “incentives” to 
																																																								
12	Ibid.,	90.		
13	Ibid.,	94.	
14	Ibid.,	90.		
15	Graber,	American	Constitutionalism,	215.	
	 7	
governing officials “to moderate their demands [or] take into account rival perspectives” on 
constitutional questions of power allocation.16 
  Determining when institutional discord is the result of constitutional defects can be 
challenging.  Breslin advises that “political differences may not be purely constitutional 
differences,” suggesting that “ongoing battles about the proper management of conflict” are 
more about “institutional parochialism” than inherent flaws in the constitution.17  Indeed, as the 
dynamic nature of governing institutions demonstrates, evolution and development occur 
through conflict and strife, often independent of changes to the constitutional text.  Therefore, it 
becomes especially important that an accurate distinction between political and constitutional 
dysfunction be made, for, without a proper diagnosis, one cannot provide an effective 
prescription.   
 Constitutional dysfunction is explicitly concerned with provisions of the text that may 
directly impede the functioning of governing institutions, specifically in attaining the purposes of 
the text.  Similarly, it can escalate into periods when the “boundaries of ordinary politics” are 
breached.18  These instances may precipitate a crisis.  Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin argue 
that certain crises, such as the 1800 presidential election, are the result of constitutional 
dysfunction as the specific method for electing a president was flawed, leading to the stalemate.19  
However, other crises, such as Watergate and the Clinton impeachment, were more political in 
nature.  As they explain, “Watergate was more a political crisis than a constitutional one.   
Nevertheless, it could easily have become a constitutional crisis at several points if Nixon had 
publicly stated (which he never did during his presidency) that he sought deliberately to go 																																																								
16	Ibid.,	246.	
17	Breslin,	From	Words	to	Worlds,	96.	
18	Sanford	Levinson	and	Jack	M.	Balkin,	“Constitutional	Crises,”	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review,	Vol.	157,	
No.	3,	(February,	2009),	738-740,	accessed	March	7,	2016,	URL:	http://www.jstor.org/stable/40380254.			
19	Ibid.,	740.		
	 8	
beyond his powers under the Constitution.”  By the same token, the Clinton impeachment was 
largely a political affair, as well, since “impeachment by itself does not constitute a constitutional 
crisis.”  Rather, it is a constitutionally-sanctioned tool for the Congress to check the executive.20  
 Examples abound where the distinction between the political and constitutional realms 
become blurred.  In assessing the contemporary American political system, Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein often conflate political strife with constitutional dysfunction.  They argue that 
the system is not operating effectively, attributing it to a myriad of factors, namely Republican 
Party extremism, the nature of sensationalist media, Senatorial procedures, and the infusion of 
money.  Empowered by these developments, self-interested political actors have hijacked the 
governing institutions, in particular Congress, to advance their own good.  As a result, gridlock 
and conflict have arisen and persisted.21 
 While some of these factors, such as money, may present constitutional questions 
pertaining to the First Amendment, many of these actors and developments are exogenous to the 
Constitution, having not been sanctioned by the text.  Further, Mann and Ornstein assert that 
political and societal factors have misused and abused governing institutions, but do not describe 
how those institutions have evolved and developed, nor offer a constitutional rubric by which to 
measure dysfunction.  By contrast, my conclusion is that governing institutions are themselves 
incapable of fully achieving the goals of the nation through the constitutionally-sanctioned 
mechanisms.  Political and societal movements are implicated, yet only to the degree that they 
have changed the nature of these institutions and their original constitutional principles.     
 We may recall that constitutions separate fundamental law from ordinary law, providing 
the proper methods to do so.  When that distinction is breached and the mechanisms are unable 																																																								
20	Ibid.,	712-713.	
21	Thomas	E.	Mann	and	Norman	J.	Ornstein,	It’s	Even	Worse	Than	It	Looks:	How	the	American	Constitutional	
System	Collided	with	the	New	Politics	of	Extremism,	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2013),	25-30;	31-43;	58-80;	84-91.	
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to perform effectively in preserving that separation, then the diagnosis is constitutional 
dysfunction.  It has not yet become a constitutional crisis, nor is it a symptom of constitutional 
failure.  These are both phenomena which are related to dysfunction, but occur under somewhat 
different circumstances.   
 
1.3  Constitutional Crisis and Failure 
 Constitutional dysfunction may persist for years without resolution.  In the face of 
worsening dysfunction, a constitutional crisis may arise.  Constitutional crises present a 
“potentially decisive turning point in the direction of the constitutional order, a moment at which 
the order threatens to break down,” the result of which “may lead back to a slightly altered status 
quo” or constitute “an important transformation in the forms and practices of power.”  In certain 
instances, it could even bring about the replacement of the constitutional regime with a new one.  
In short, such crises “mark the moments when constitutions threaten to fail” at “mak[ing] politics 
possible.”22  
 As with constitutional dysfunction, constitutional crises may manifest in different ways, 
shapes, and forms.  Levinson and Balkin identify three types of constitutional crises.  The first is 
when a political leader seizes emergency powers to preserve the social order, in effect becoming 
a dictator.23  The second crisis arises from an “excessive fidelity to a failing constitution,” when 
the observance of the text’s stipulations leads to heightened tension and strife.  One such 
example of this form includes the three-fifths rule of slave representation, which determined the 
results of presidential elections and the composition of the House of Representatives, but 
																																																								
22	Levinson	and	Balkin,	“Constitutional	Crises,”	714-715.	
23	Ibid.,	721.	
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contributed to increased instability and tension.24  The third type of crisis is when political actors 
assert that they have been faithful to the Constitution, but “disagree about what the [text] requires 
and about who holds the appropriate degree of power.”  As Levinson and Balkin add, “each side 
may claim that their opponents are violating the Constitution.”  These crises are only resolved 
“when one side or the other backs down and agrees … to the practical legality of the new legal 
status quo.”25  However, in such crises, they warn that certain interested parties may move 
“outside the ordinary boundaries of politics in an effort to win.”26  As such, the 1800 presidential 
election deadlock and the 1860-1861 secession crisis were instances where ordinary politics had 
been breached and extra-constitutional measures were threatened or undertaken.27 
 In some instances, constitutional crises are resolved both politically and constitutionally.  
For example, the 1800 election deadlock was broken when James Bayard of Delaware, a 
Federalist, abstained from voting, allowing the political impasse to end.  The constitutional 
defect was eventually resolved when the 12th Amendment established separate electoral ballots 
for presidential and vice presidential candidates.  When constitutional crises are left unresolved, 
however, they could lead to constitutional failure.  
   Constitutional failure is, in essence, about the breakdown of the constitutional order or 
the inability of the text to remain operable.  The Civil War represented the failure of the 
American Constitution to placate its disparate regions.  The text’s protection of slavery 
contributed to chronic dysfunction in realizing a collective public character.  It failed to unify the 
nation, with the South committed to a different interpretation of slavery.  Periodic constitutional 
crises erupted, but were never fully resolved.  Political compromises were strung together, such 																																																								
24	Ibid.,	732-733.		
25	Ibid.,	738.	
26	Ibid.,	739.	
27	Ibid.,	740.	
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as the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850, but the underlying 
constitutional remedies were less forthcoming.  Societal fragmentation continued unabated, 
political tensions worsened, and national unity dissolved, culminating in the eruption of war.  
The constitutional regime broke down as the nation was torn asunder.  Similarly, the French 
Fourth Republic was unable to adequately manage its societal fragmentation and adversarial 
politics.  In fact, such parties as the Communists and the Gaullists outright “rejected the regime.”  
As such, the pervasive dysfunction rendered an “unstable, ineffective, and immobilist 
democracy.”  Ultimately, the crisis of the Algerian War placed such a “heavy burden” on the 
system that it was eventually replaced.28  
When the constitutional order fails, it “is signified by the breakdown of a political regime 
established or authorized by a constitution.”  As Mark Brandon explains, “The failure of a 
constitutional order can be unreflective and unselfconscious, perhaps gradual, even almost 
imperceptible.”29  During the Civil War, the text remained in use, but a contingent of the polity 
had divorced itself from the order to establish its own constitutional regime.  Brandon suggests 
that the South may not have rejected the constitutional text as much as they sought “to preserve 
it in a new political order,” with an interpretation more faithful to the principles of the 
document.30 
 Constitutional failure need not always be accompanied by violence and war.  A second 
iteration of failure is, quite simply, the “discarding, abandoning, or ignoring [of] a particular 
constitution.”  The elimination of one constitution and the reconstitution of a new text may 
																																																								
28	Arend	Lijphart,	Democracy	in	Plural	Societies:	A	Comparative	Exploration,	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	
1977),	114-117.	
29	Mark	E.	Brandon,	“Constitutionalism	and	Constitutional	Failure,”	The	Good	Society,	Vol.	9,	No.	2,	(1999),	66,	
accessed	March	7,	2016,	URL:	http://www.jstor.org/stable/20710953.	
30	Ibid.		
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involve self-conscious reflection and deliberation.31  Indeed, the scrapping of the Articles of 
Confederation and the drafting of a new constitution in 1787 was achieved with debate and 
choice rather than violence and bloodshed.  
 
1.4  Conclusion 
 Constitutions have many purposes.  They establish the political framework of the state, 
set the proper limits on the governing authority, and distinguish ordinary law from fundamental, 
constitutional law.  They must also reflect the needs and circumstances of the nation, as well as 
forge a collective identity.  To that end, specific constitutional goals, such as the US preamble, 
may be espoused in conjunction with the text.  In short, constitutions provide clarity and 
certainty to the polity to achieve regime legitimacy, institutional stability, and societal unity.  
Each reinforces the other.   
   The constitution is functional when its ability to realize the polity’s objectives through 
the proper mechanisms and channels remains unimpeded.   However, constitutional dysfunction 
arises when those mechanisms and channels impair the effective functioning toward the nation’s 
purposes.  Persistent and chronic dysfunction could potentially lead to the eruption of 
constitutional crises.  In these instances, actors may turn to extra-constitutional methods, such as 
seizing emergency powers or taking up arms.  When such crises are not resolved politically and 
constitutionally, then the constitution itself, or the constitutional order, may break down and be 
transformed.   
 
 
 
 																																																								
31	Ibid.,	65.	
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FOUNDING 
 
 The Founding period was one of great challenge to the American nation.  The nascent 
American state, forged by the conflict with Great Britain, was soon confronted by the excesses 
and abuses of state assemblies.  The politics of liberty, which defined the essence of the 
Revolution, was left unfettered.  With powerful legislatures, weak state executives, and 
widespread direct democracy, majoritarianism was ascendant.  As these popular majorities went 
unchecked, currencies, property rights, and contracts were increasingly threatened.  Emblematic 
of this turmoil, Shays’ Rebellion, a series of uprisings against taxes and debts, erupted in western 
Massachusetts.  Such tendencies, however, were soon to be displaced by a new revolution in 
1787, one of order and stability.1 
 Several leaders were determined to redress the deficiencies of the Articles of 
Confederation, the system of government that had hastily been created during the Revolution.  
The national government consisted of a single legislative body with no executive branch.  
Members were chosen annually by state legislatures and were subject to their recall.  Each state 
had a single vote.  The approval of nine out of thirteen states was required to enact legislation.  
As such, it was notoriously difficult to collect taxes and raise an army as requisitions depended 
on the assent of the states.2  The Constitution of 1787 was the culmination of several months of 
debate, discourse, and compromise.  While it fell short of perfection, it represents a guideline to 
good governance.   The Framers themselves may not have been perfect, but they understood 
human imperfections enough to craft a regime which manages the frailties and vices of man.  For 
example, they understood that ambition, while inevitable, could be harnessed for infusing energy 																																																								
1	Isaac	Kramnick,	“Editor’s	Introduction,”	in	The	Federalist	Papers,	ed.	Isaac	Kramnick	(London:	Penguin	Group,	
1987),	16-17.	
2	Ibid.,	18-21.	
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and vitality into government, thereby ensuring a durable separation of powers.  As James 
Madison argues, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The interest of the man must 
be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, 
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”3 
 In setting up a Constitution, the Framers listed several purposes of the new regime.  
Enumerated in the preamble, these words comprise the aspirational goals of the nation: 
 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
 
In envisioning an ever-improving national community, the preamble has fueled many a reform 
movement, particularly those committed to providing justice and the blessings of liberty equally 
to all Americans.  Others have stressed the importance of domestic tranquility and the common 
defense.   
  While the goals of the preamble are important, they are quite general in their nature.  As 
such, the text specifies the institutions and processes by which to achieve them.  These 
constitutional mechanisms and procedures are undergirded by principles, which were of great 
value to the Framers.  First, legitimacy for the regime was required, and to that end, the Framers 
established a republican form of government, ensuring that the participation of the citizenry was 
safeguarded.  They found order and stability to be necessary, as well, and therefore pursued 
limits on majoritarianism through entrenched, insulated branches of government.  They sought to 																																																								
3	James	Madison,	“Federalist	No.	51,”	in	The	Federalist	Papers,	319.	
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create vibrant governing institutions with the requisite power and independence to enforce the 
law, but limited in their scope so as not to endanger the rights and liberties of the people.  
Finally, to strengthen societal cohesion, the Framers advocated reverence for the Constitution. 
 
2.1  Regime Legitimacy 
 Legitimacy for the regime was of utmost concern to the Framers.  To ensure the new 
government commanded the support of the people, they established a representative democracy.  
A republican form of governance would safeguard a political right deemed essential, the right to 
vote.  In “Federalist No. 52,” Madison declares, “The right of suffrage is very justly regarded as 
a fundamental article of republican government.”4  At that time, suffrage neither extended to 
slaves nor to certain citizens, such as women.  Although limited as it was to white, male 
landowners, the right to vote nonetheless provided the foundation to the American Republic.    
The House of Representatives has embodied the most democratic tendencies of the 
Constitution, and is, in essence, a majoritarian chamber.  States are represented by population, 
and its members are elected directly by the people.  Several Framers had opposed this method of 
selection.  Roger Sherman cautioned that “the people … should have as little to do as may be 
about the government.  They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled.”  
Similarly, Elbridge Gerry warned “the people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended 
patriots.”  Despite such opposition, the direct participation of the citizenry prevailed.  George 
Mason believed “it was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the 
government.”  Echoing such sentiment, Madison argued “popular election … as essential to 
every plan of free government … He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raised would be 
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more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves.”5  He 
further insisted that it “had the additional advantage, of securing better representatives.”6   
Frequent elections were also deemed necessary for the House of Representatives, as 
essential as the direct election by the people.  In “Federalist No. 52,” Madison implored that the 
House of Representatives ought to “have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate 
sympathy with, the people.”  To that end, he suggests, “Frequent elections are unquestionably the 
only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.”7  
The issue of biennial elections was contentious.  Many had favored shorter terms.  Oliver 
Ellsworth favored annual elections, suggesting, “The people were fond of frequent elections, and 
might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature.”  James Wilson concurred, “This 
frequency was most familiar and pleasing to the people.”  Besides, he did not believe it 
“necessary for the National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps not half, perhaps not one-fourth 
of the year.”  Roger Sherman, content with either annual or biennial elections, insisted that 
representatives “ought to return home and mix with the people.”  By remaining at the seat of 
government, they may lose touch with constituent interests.  Others had opposed annual elections 
on the basis of inconvenience.  Edmund Randolph “would have preferred annual to biennial, but 
for the extent of the United States, and the inconvenience which would result from them to the 
representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire.”  While John Dickinson, who favored 
triennial elections, noted that the annual election “was borrowed from the ancient usage of 
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England, a country much less extensive than ours.”8  The Convention ultimately adopted two-
year terms for representatives.   
The legitimacy of the Senate, the institution devised to represent the interests of states, 
was assured by its method of selection.  The Framers largely agreed that state legislatures should 
decide.  Roger Sherman believed “a due harmony between the [state and national] governments 
would be maintained.”  John Dickinson argued that “a sense of the states would be better 
collected,” insisting further that state legislatures were best equipped to choose “the most 
distinguished characters.”  George Mason explained that such a method provided added security 
to states “against encroachments of the National Government … And what better means can we 
provide, than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the 
national establishment?”9   
Equal representation within the Senate similarly safeguarded states’ clout.  While 
Madison had opposed equal apportionment, he nonetheless conceded that “a government 
founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of larger States, is not likely to be obtained 
from the smaller States.”  Therefore, a compromise was necessary to attract the support of 
smaller states, who may have felt overwhelmed by the representation of their larger neighbors in 
the lower house.  Equality in the Senate was “a constitutional recognition of the portion of 
sovereignty remaining in the individual states,” and it strengthened the station of states in the 
new federal government.  Therefore, Madison argues, large states ought to support equal 
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representation as well, “since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, 
against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.”10  
 
2.2  Institutional Stability  
 The Framers were equally concerned with institutional stability.  They wanted to ensure 
that governing institutions were adequately secure to govern.  The overdependence of the 
national government on state legislatures and frequent elections had rendered those institutions 
unstable, dooming the regime of the Articles of Confederation.  Madison decried “instability [as] 
one of the great vices of our republics to be remedied.”11  Limiting majoritarianism would 
maintain and preserve the new constitutional order and its long-term durability.  The republican 
form of government, which had afforded a degree of legitimacy to the Constitution, would 
similarly serve to insure stability for its institutions.   
    The Senate, in particular, was established to curb popular tendencies expected from the 
House of Representatives.  As Madison declared at the Convention, “The use of the Senate is to 
consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than the 
popular branch.”  He stated that a numerous upper house would, in effect, duplicate the lower 
house.   “Enlarge their number,” he argued,” and you communicate to them the vices which they 
are meant to correct.”  He went on to suggest, “The more the representatives of the people, 
therefore, were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more 
liable they became to be divided among themselves, either from their own indiscretions or the 
artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust.”  																																																								
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Similarly, Elbridge Gerry favored a Senate which, as long as it was selected by state legislatures, 
would “provide some check in favor of the commercial interest against the landed; without 
which, oppression will take place; and no free government can last long where that is the case.”12  
Edmund Randolph exclaimed, “The object of this second branch is, to control the democratic 
branch of the National Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch, being more 
numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it.”13  
 One method of limiting majoritiarianism and guaranteeing a firm, stable body, was by 
extending senatorial terms.  The Framers agreed that Senate terms should be longer than those of 
their congressional counterparts.  Although General Pinckney cautioned that long terms would 
risk Senators losing touch with their constituent interests, he nonetheless favored four-year 
terms, not insignificant for the time.  Similarly, Roger Sherman declared frequent elections 
“necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers.”  However, many others argued for a more 
entrenched Senate.  Madison favored a “considerable duration,” specifically seven years, and 
once more urged the Convention to recognize that, while “every guard to liberty” be preserved, 
they should all be “equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had 
particularly pointed out,” namely unstable institutions.  Roger Wilson noted that “The Senate … 
ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign nations.”  He bemoaned the lack of 
“confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government” by such foreign powers as Great 
Britain, and advocated for nine year terms.  Gerry “admitted the evils arising from a frequency of 
elections,” but cautioned that the most pragmatic approach would be four or five years.  
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Anything longer “never would be adopted by the people.”14  Eventually, the Convention adopted 
a six-year term for Senators, with a third subject to election every two years.   
 The Framers had similar concerns regarding the executive.  They opted to not only 
entrench the institution with a four-year term, but remove its selection from the people.  During 
the Constitutional Convention, the delegates agreed initially to entrust its selection with the 
National Legislature, much the way a parliamentary system operates.  Although they were not 
completely comfortable with this arrangement, it was far more preferable than permitting the 
people the decision.  Fear of popular majorities permeated the debate over the election of the 
executive.   
 Gouverneur Morris did support popular suffrage for determining the executive.  He 
asserted, “If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished 
character, or services.”  Colonel Mason countered, “The extent of the country renders it 
impossible, that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions 
of the candidates.”  Sherman agreed, stating that the people “will never be sufficiently informed 
of characters, and besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will 
generally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance 
for the appointment.”   Charles Pinckney expressed similar concerns, declaring, “An election by 
the people being liable to the most obvious and striking objections.  They will be led by a few 
active and designing men. The most populous States, by combining in favor of the same 
individual, will be able to carry their points.”  The proposal for an election by the people was 
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defeated 9-1, with Pennsylvania as its sole supporter.15  Ultimately, the Framers adopted a plan 
whereby electors chosen by states (initially state legislatures) would decide upon the executive, 
two-steps removed from popular whims.     
 In devising a judicial branch, the delegates expressed similar reservations about 
majorities and instability.  To ensure that the Supreme Court was sufficiently isolated from 
popular currents, the Framers opted to have its members chosen by the executive and approved 
by the Senate.  Further, unlike the other branches whose terms were limited, the Court’s judges 
were granted life tenure under the “standard of good behavior.”  Alexander Hamilton defends 
life tenure for Supreme Court judges as an “excellent barrier to the encroachments and 
oppressions of the representative body,” and necessary “to secure a steady, upright, and impartial 
administration of the laws.”  In “Federalist No. 78,” he argues that the Court's independence and 
entrenchment from majorities “may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humors in the society,” without which would witness “unjust and partial laws” that threaten the 
private property rights of all citizens.16  Hamilton ties his fears of tyrannical majorities to a 
proper and impartial adjudication of the law.  
 Additionally, Hamilton argues that judicial officers require “permanency” because of the 
extensive task of educating and familiarizing oneself with “a voluminous code of laws.”  Indeed, 
he asserts that it “must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of 
them.”  As such, “there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the 
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.”17  At the Convention, Madison also highlighted 
the unique qualifications for judges.  In expressing skepticism of permitting a legislative 																																																								
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appointment, he argued that legislators “were not judges of the requisite qualifications,” noting 
“the legislative talents, which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly 
recommended men to the favor of legislative assemblies.”18 
 
2.3  Effective Governance, Limited Scope 
 The persistent constitutional dysfunction of the Articles of Confederation in performing 
essential tasks of governance increasingly frustrated the Framers, especially as periodic crises, 
such as Shays’ Rebellion, seriously jeopardized the continued adequacy of the government.  To 
remedy these deficiencies, they endeavored to establish capable institutions equipped with the 
requisite power and energy to effectively govern.  Certain powers, such as taxation, creation of 
an army, and regulation of interstate commerce, were vital to ensuring that the national 
government became an instrument of effective governance.   
 In “Federalist No. 30,” Hamilton defends the power of taxation as “an indispensable 
ingredient in every constitution,” without which “either the people must be subjected to continual 
plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the 
government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.”  He bemoans 
the impotence of the Articles of Confederation in requisitioning money from the states as 
“inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public 
treasury.”  To these challenges, he posits, “What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis 
fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the 
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ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil 
government?”19 
 Hamilton was perhaps more emphatic arguing for adequate power in the raising of an 
army for national defense.   He declares that once the “federal government [is] entrusted with the 
care of the common defense … there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide 
for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in 
any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.”  Once 
more, he describes the then-existing government as “defective,” insisting “that if we are in 
earnest about giving the Union energy and duration … we must discard the fallacious scheme of 
quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust.”  To that end, Hamilton 
recommends “that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and 
equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an 
army and navy.”20 
 The regulation of interstate commerce was not only an economic power necessary for an 
effective central government, but important in establishing the national government as an arbiter, 
of sorts, between competing interests of the states.  Without the “enlarged and permanent 
interest” of a strong union of states vested with regulation of interstate commerce, Madison 
warns, “We may be assured by past experience … that it would nourish unceasing animosities, 
and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility.”21 
 The Framers were also conscious of the need for a strong and vibrant executive, one with 
sufficient independence to effectively carry out and enforce the law.  Precisely to ensure that the 
executive operated capably, the delegates vested all the executive power into a single individual.  																																																								
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Several members objected to the concept of a unitary executive.  Edmund Randolph “regarded it 
as the fetus of monarchy,” and “could not see why the great requisites for the executive 
department, vigor, dispatch, and responsibility, could not be found in three men, as well as in one 
man.”  Roger Wilson countered that, to the contrary, “unity in the Executive … would be the 
best safeguard against tyranny,” and would offer the “most energy, dispatch, and responsibility, 
to the office.”  John Rutledge concurred, contending, “A single man would feel the greatest 
responsibility, and administer the public affairs best.”22  Elbridge Gerry cautioned that a plural 
executive would prove “extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military 
matters … It would be a general with three heads.”23  The drive for “energy, dispatch, and 
responsibility” in a single executive carried the day.   
 The delegates also strived to assure independence for the executive.  One method of 
securing this autonomy was by a proper selection method.  The pervasive fear of popular 
majorities had quickly eliminated election by the people.  Although the Framers pegged the 
executive’s selection to the national legislature, they were not comfortable with this arrangement 
either.  Madison articulated these concerns when he explained, “If it be a fundamental principle 
of free government that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers should be separately 
exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There is the same, and perhaps 
greater, reason why the Executive should be independent of the Legislature, than why the 
Judiciary should.”  He went on to argue, “It is essential, then, that the appointment of the 
Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a 
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free agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be, if he was to be appointable, from 
time to time, by the Legislature.”  Madison feared “intrigues and contentions” would arise “that 
ought not to be unnecessarily admitted.”24  
 Others agreed with Madison’s assessment.  Gerry believed, “There would be a constant 
intrigue kept up for the appointment.  The Legislature and the candidates would bargain and play 
into one another’s hands.”25  Gouverneur Morris argued, “One great object of the Executive is, to 
control the Legislature … [and] that in every view this indirect dependence on the favor of the 
Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment.”26  He 
exclaimed that the executive would “be the mere creature of the Legislature, if appointed and 
impeachable by that body,” likening it to the “election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real 
merit will rarely be the title to the appointment.”  Wilson admitted that the legislature “deserve 
confidence in some respects,” but should be distrusted where “jealousy was warranted,” and that 
included executive appointment.27  Randolph asserted that, if the legislature were to select the 
executive, the latter ought not to be eligible for re-election as it would compromise his 
independence. “If he should be re-appointable by the legislature, he will be no check on it.”28 
 The Framers had also understood that effective governing institutions would require 
strengthening the national government vis-à-vis the states.  State legislatures had concerned a 
number of the delegates, in particular Madison.  He had initially opposed permitting the states to 																																																								
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select their own Senators, arguing, “The great evils complained of were that the State 
Legislatures run into schemes of paper-money,” and such vices would be adversely transmitted 
to the national legislature. “Their influence … may be expected to promote it.”29  To assuage 
these reservations, the delegates established mechanisms and procedures to limit the influence of 
state legislatures. 
An early concept which was proposed in the Virginia Plan was that of the Council of 
Revision.  This council would consist of the executive and “a convenient number” of the 
Supreme Court.30  They would have had the power to veto any act by the national legislature or 
the state legislatures.  Madison contended, “It would … be useful to the community at large, as 
an additional check against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust measures which constituted so 
great a portion of our calamities.”  He remained firmly in favor of checking the powers of 
legislatures.  As he explained, “Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in 
the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the 
American Constitutions.”  Colonel Mason agreed.  He believed the legislature “would still so 
much resemble that of the individual States, that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust 
and pernicious laws.”31  The Council of Revision would undoubtedly have strengthened the 
national government to an extent that states may have been unnecessarily shackled to the federal 
government, weakening the balance of federalism that eventually emerged.  Despite this 
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possibility, the Convention ultimately defeated the proposal on the grounds that it violated the 
principle of separation of powers.   
 The delegates did unanimously agree to remove the recall provision, which had so 
hampered the government under the Articles of Confederation.  No longer were states permitted 
the prerogative to recall their federal representatives.  Additionally, it was decided that officers 
of the national government ought to be salaried by the funds of said government.  Madison felt it 
“improper to leave the members of the National Legislature to be provided for by the State 
Legislatures, because it would create an improper dependence.”  Colonel Mason concurred, 
suggesting that inequality would prevail if left to the states.  “The different States would make 
different provision for their representatives.”   He further suspected that it would prove a 
disincentive for representatives, as the states “might reduce the provision so low, that, as had 
already happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be, not who were most 
fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.”32  
 It was deemed essential that the Constitution contain an explicit Supremacy Clause, so as 
to ensure that state legislatures could not nullify national legislation.  In “Federalist No. 33,” 
Hamilton explains:  
 
A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy.  It is a rule which those to 
whom it is prescribed are bound to observe … Hence we perceive that the clause which 
declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before 
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considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the 
institution of a federal government.33 
 
In addressing concerns that such supremacy may entitle the national government to usurp the 
powers of state legislatures, he counters that the supremacy clause only applies “to laws 
made pursuant to the Constitution,” that is, expressly enumerated in the text.  All other purviews 
remain with the states.  He suggested that “a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United 
States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled,” since 
taxation was reserved for the national government, “yet a law for abrogating or preventing the 
collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not 
be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution.” 34 
 The Framers were comfortable granting such powers as taxation and regulation of 
interstate commerce to strong, independent governing institutions whose authority was supreme 
so long as that authority remained within the purviews prescribed by and “pursuant to the 
Constitution.”  The Constitution explicitly delimits each branch.  Powers not expressly delegated 
were to be reserved to the states.   
 The limited scope and structure of the national government was understood to protect the 
rights of citizens and the prerogatives of states.  The inability of one branch to usurp the 
authority of another branch guards against undue intrusions of power which may abrogate 
citizens’ rights, either in the form of a dictator or a tyrannical majority.  Indeed, the nature of the 
Constitution led many Framers to consider a Bill of Rights unnecessary.  Hamilton argued 
extensively against its inclusion.  In “Federalist No. 84,” he asserts, “The truth is, after all the 																																																								
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declamation we have heard, that the constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every 
useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS … And the proposed constitution, if adopted, will be the 
bill of rights of the union.”  He contends: 
 
Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the 
citizens in the structure and administration of the government? This is done in the most 
ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention, comprehending various 
precautions for the public security … Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain 
immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private 
concerns? This we have seen has also been attended to … Adverting therefore to the 
substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the 
work of the convention.35 
 
 Further, Hadley Arkes argues that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights would presume new 
powers which had not been delegated to the national government by the Constitution.  He 
explains: 
 
If the Bill of Rights represented a certain reservation of natural rights to the people, the 
implication would quickly arise that the government may exercise all of those powers 
which had not been explicitly withheld.  The paradoxical result was that this reservation 
of rights might actually enlarge the total powers of the government.  It would remove 
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from the government the burden of justifying its use of authority in a wide range of cases 
in which its measures were not explicitly forbidden.36  
 
The Constitution delegates power to the national government, reserving residuary authority to 
the states and the people.  A Bill of Rights inverts this formula, representing a reservation of 
rights, and, as Arkes suggests, implying more power to the national government than had been 
granted by the text.   
 
2.4  Societal Cohesion and Unity 
 The Framers knew that effecting societal cohesion would be important and quite 
challenging.  Societies are especially complex and notoriously difficult to engineer.  Therefore, 
they opted to craft a Constitution which itself was limited and minimally involved in societal 
affairs.  Nonetheless, the effective realization of the preceding constitutional principles goes a 
long way toward assuring societal unity. 
 Firstly, representative government may lend legitimacy to the regime.  The people 
maintain an attachment to the national government via their representatives, who safeguard their 
interests and concerns.  Entrenched, strong, and independent institutions may offer effective 
governance and stability, important considerations for the long-term dependability and reliability 
of the government.  Finally, the limited scope of authority may protect the rights and liberties of 
the citizens, thereby assuaging any lingering concerns of the capacities of the regime.   
 When a society has attained legitimacy, trust, and dependability in its institutions, then 
societal conflict will be more easily managed within the legal and constitutional procedures 
available.  Policy disputes, political disagreements, even outright political conflict will be 																																																								
36	Hadley	Arkes,	Beyond	the	Constitution,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1990),	60.		
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transmitted into the appropriate channels.  If the above principles are undermined and societies 
lose faith in their government, then extra-constitutional measures may be threatened, potentially 
leading to constitutional failure. It is, therefore, important that the constitutional principles are 
preserved so as to allow the Constitution to continue serving as a mechanism for conflict 
management.   
 An effective Constitution can contribute to societal cohesion.  It strengthens reverence 
among the people for their government.  Yet, it is also quite cyclical.  “Reverence,” according to 
Breslin, “is part of what gives the constitutional document its principal force.”37  Indeed, as 
Madison argues, “Frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of that 
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest 
governments would not possess the requisite stability.”38 Strong support from the people can 
ensure that the Constitution is a workable and useful force for managing conflict, representing 
interests, and forging a collective public identity.   
 
2.5  Conclusion 
While the Framers outlined the nation’s aspirational goals in the preamble of the 
Constitution, they designed a specific framework of government to achieve them.  These 
institutions and mechanisms are undergirded by several important principles valued highly by the 
Framers.  They included legitimacy for the regime via representative government; institutional 
stability by way of entrenched governing bodies; and effective governance with strong, 
independent branches, but limited in their scope so as to protect the rights and liberties of the 
citizens and powers of the states.  The realization of these constitutional principles could 																																																								
37	Beau	Breslin,	From	Words	to	Worlds:	Exploring	Constitutional	Functionality,	(Baltimore:	The	Johns	Hopkins	
University	Press,	2009),	25.	
38	James	Madison,	“Federalist	No.	49,”	in	The	Federalist	Papers,	313-314.	
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contribute to long-term societal cohesion, which would generate greater reverence for the 
regime.  Such reverence, thereby, ultimately strengthens the force of the Constitution.  An 
inability to achieve these principles may invite extra-constitutional activity, and perhaps even 
constitutional failure.   
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CHAPTER THREE: THE UNFOUNDING 
 
Developments since the Founding have profoundly reshaped the landscape of the 
American political system.  Constitutional amendments have altered the structure of government 
and federalism.  Institutional developments have shifted the scope of authority and balance of 
power.  Evolving norms of democracy, rights protection, and states’ rights have redefined the 
concept of citizenship, governance, and the role of the state.  On the whole, these developments 
have supplanted the regime designed by the Framers, which stressed a limited government 
largely insulated from the people, with one of greater democratic accountability and enlarged 
scope of authority.   
Partly, these developments may be attributed to what Jack Balkin has defined as 
“ideological drift,” ideas and symbols whose meanings are not fixed, but rather fluid, fluctuating 
with changing contexts and understandings.  He explains that drift may involve either “the 
content of the idea … held constant” with “changing political consequences [amid] changing 
contexts,” or “the content of the idea or symbol changing as the context surrounding it 
changes.”1  This may equally apply to governing institutions, as well.   Institutions may remain 
unchanged throughout history, but subject to changing expectations by political actors and 
society as its role in the polity evolves, or the nature of these institutions may change amid 
developing contexts and periods.     
 Ultimately, having defined constitutional dysfunction in “Chapter One” as the degree to 
which institutions impair the fulfillment of their constitutional purposes via constitutional means, 
then one can argue that the inability of existing mechanisms and procedures to achieve the 
principles valued by the Framers, namely regime legitimacy, institutional stability, independent, 																																																								
1	Jack	M.	Balkin,	“Ideological	Drift	and	the	Struggle	Over	Meaning,”	Connecticut	Law	Review,	Vol.	25,	(1993),	
accessed	March	7,	2016,	URL:	http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/iddrift1.htm.		
	 34	
but limited branches, and societal cohesion, has, in effect, contributed to constitutional 
dysfunction.   
 
3.1  The House of Representatives 
The House of Representatives was slated to be the most responsive branch, as attested by 
its biennial elections.2  Nonetheless, the two-year term was longer than the single-year terms 
which were common at the time in state legislatures, and therefore, represented a balance 
between democratic accountability and institutional stability.3  However, certain political trends 
have increasingly rendered the office more responsive and perhaps less stable, as measured by 
the frequency of wave elections, the degree of partisan polarization, and number of primaries.       
Wave elections, or “tidal wave congressional elections,” are not novel.  The phenomenon 
has occurred throughout American history, where large margins are claimed by one party, 
assuring it greater power in Congress.  At times, these elections have signaled deep, decisive, 
and dramatic shifts in the political direction of the nation, an occurrence Walter Dean Burnham 
defines as “critical realignment.”  According to Theodore Rosenof, the “essential conclusion” of 
Burnham, and his contemporaries, Key and Schattschneider, was that a realignment period 
“provided opportunities for major developments in public policy.  A crisis resulting in electoral 
upheaval, a perceived mandate from the voters, the momentum of a decisive victory, and the 
likelihood of enhanced partisan majorities in government all provided the basis for far-reaching 
changes and innovations in public policy.”4  
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While wave elections have not always been manifestations of realignment, they were still 
considered “once-a-generation occurrence[s].”  As Walter Shapiro explains, “In 1958 it was the 
Republican recession; in 1974 it was Watergate; and in 1994 it was Bill Clinton's failed health-
care reform proposal.”  In many respects, these elections are the antithesis to Speaker Tip 
O’Neil’s refrain “all politics is local,” for the essence of a wave election is its nationalization of 
issues.  However, the frequency of wave elections has been increasing.5  In the last decade, such 
elections have occurred twice (2006 and 2010), both witnessing a change in party control of the 
House of Representatives.  Wave-like elections, where one party runs the board and sweeps all 
relevant races, have occurred in 2008 and 2014, but these did not witness especially large 
margins in the House.  Therefore, only the 2006 and 2010 elections had heavily affected the 
House.   
Wave elections may remain manageable for existing branches, even if they continue to 
become more frequent.  However, when they are coupled with party polarization, their effects 
become particularly jarring for governing institutions.  Political parties are increasingly more 
polarized, aligning closely along ideological contours.  Southern conservative Democrats and 
northern Rockefeller Republicans have ceased to exist.  The Democratic Party represents a 
liberal voting bloc with less in common with the Republican Party’s conservative bloc with each 
passing election.  It is disputed whether or not primaries are responsible.6  Others have contended 
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that wave elections have contributed to the greater prevalence of ideologically purer parties.7  
Regardless of its causes, party polarization has continued apace, showing few signs of abating.8  
The significance of polarized parties is that they have dramatically increased the stakes of 
congressional elections.  When the parties had shared a large moderate bloc, an appreciable 
overlap existed between them.  Any change to party control did not permit significant deviation 
from the center as neither side could afford to lose such support.  Today, changes in control of 
the House present radically different conceptions of government, society, and constitutionalism, 
with little room for agreement.  Party polarization and wave elections have invited political 
whiplash, frequent and dramatic shifts in the ideological and political direction of the nation.9 
The House of Representatives may not necessarily remain unstable.  Years could pass 
with one party fully in control and few changes to the branch.  However, this does not preclude 
the possibility of additional instability in the future.  So long as party polarization continues, any 
change in control, even in the absence of wave elections, could trigger political whiplash.  Such 
changes may occur more often during periods of social unrest and economic uncertainty.   
Additionally, congressional primaries have gained in import in deciding nominees for 
office.10  Members are not only subjected to a general election of their constituency in 
November, but to a primary election of partisan voters several months before.  At its most basic, 
primaries ensure that at least two elections are held during a single congressional term.  The 
Framers wanted a branch that was responsive to the needs and interests of the people, but they 																																																								
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nonetheless opted for two-years, a compromise between overly-responsive annual elections and 
the stability that comes from added insularity.  In light of recent political developments, it is 
certainly worth considering whether the House has become too responsive. 
 
3.2  The Senate 
 The Senate was created to represent the interests of states, affording legitimacy to the 
regime particularly at a time when many had viewed the Constitution as a social contract, a 
compact of sovereign states.11  As such, state legislatures were vested with the power to select 
Senators.  However, these legislatures were increasingly viewed as corrupt and beholden to 
business interests, much to the detriment of workers and low-income Americans.  The 
Progressives championed the cause of the downtrodden, promising to achieve an enlarged 
capacity of the state and greater participation of the citizenry.12  To that end, they sought to make 
the Senate more responsive to the people and less dependent on state legislatures.  They were 
eventually successful when, in 1914, the United States ratified the 17th Amendment, stipulating 
henceforth the direct election of Senators.   
 The legitimacy of the Constitution rested on a balance between satisfying state interests 
and the people at large.  The former was ensured through the upper chamber, while the latter 
through the lower chamber.  The Civil War and the 14th Amendment fundamentally reshaped the 
system of Federalism, significantly curtailing state power and ending “compact theory,” as later 
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validated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas v. White in 1868.13  Those trends were 
furthered with the ratification of the 17th Amendment, with the selection of Senators removed 
from state legislatures and granted to the people.  As Mark Levin explains, “The balance of 
power that had existed between the states and the federal government … was dealt a critical 
blow.  The long silence of the states had begun.”14   
The Senate was also designed to be removed from the popular impulses of society.15  
C.H. Hoebeke asserts that this was partly to “insulate senators against popular pressures to 
sacrifice the national interest to regional ones.”  The direct election of Senators rendered the 
branch “more responsive, by definition less deliberative.”16  While they remain entrenched, with 
six-year terms, they are less insular than originally envisioned.  One of the arguments made at 
the Convention was that an institution could not be an adequate check on another, while 
simultaneously owing its selection to it.17  Popular election of Senators may disrupt this formula.  
Originally intended as a check on majorities, the Senate has become dependent on it for its own 
selection.   
Historically, the Senate had remained firmer and more stable than the lower branch, with 
party control changing only five times between 1857, when the current party system emerged, 
and 1915.  The House witnessed control change eight times during the same period.  However, 
since the direct election of Senators, the Senate has become more volatile, changing party control 																																																								
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more frequently than the House.18  The upper house has become exposed to the same forces and 
dynamics that have plagued the lower house, namely increasingly frequent wave elections, party 
polarization, and the resulting political whiplash.  Having changed party control twice in the last 
decade, some have suggested it could again in the near future.19  
By providing increased democratic accountability of Senators, the Seventeenth 
Amendment sought to “reduce the influence of wealthy elites, decrease the role of money in 
determining Senate election outcomes, and give incumbent senators the incentive to represent 
their constituents responsively.”  However, Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart conclude that 
“the direct power to elect their senators has not appreciably increased the Senate’s 
responsiveness or efficiency,” adding: 
 
In the case of the Senate, before the Seventeenth Amendment, Senate candidates tended 
to be elite party members who could call on wealthy and influential friends to support 
their campaigns for office. After the Seventeenth Amendment, the same types of 
candidates continued to rely on the support of the same wealthy and influential people— 
- they just redirected how the resources garnered through this support were aimed.20  
 
Additionally, primaries have subjected Senators, as with House members, to compete in 
two elections during a single term, one of which is far less representative of the constituency-at-
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large.  Therefore, Senators must balance their responsibilities to the office against political 
considerations for re-election, firstly by appeasing party primary voters and then satisfying 
constituent voters.  In 2016, Senator Richard Shelby, the chairman of the Senate Banking 
Committee, opted to “halt his committee’s work until later in March,” for, as he explained, “I 
have a primary, you know.”21  Shelby’s fears are not entirely unfounded.  Between 1996 and 
2012, primaries have claimed the political lives of seven Senators.  Historically, more Senatorial 
primary defeats occurred in earlier periods, such as the late 1940s, late 1960s, and late 1970s, yet 
these seven represent an uptick in recent years.22  Notwithstanding the likelihood that a Senator 
has a considerable probability of surviving a primary challenge, the perception of its threat 
remains great.  The Framers had not intended Senators to weigh such considerations.   
Collectively, these political developments have all rendered the Senate more responsive to 
popular whim and the people than that for which it was originally designed.  
 
3.3  The Presidency 
 The Presidency has been subjected to similar democratic trends as the Senate.  The 
institution was originally designed to be entrenched, with four-year terms, and chosen by 
electors, ensuring that it could adequately check legislative and popular majorities, while 
exercising sufficient independence to operate effectively.23  Its method of selection, however, has 
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evolved.  Initially, presidential electors were chosen by state legislatures.  Once states began 
awarding these electors to the winner of their respective popular votes, the Electoral College 
became increasingly futile.  Since the selection method has not migrated completely to a popular 
vote election, a mixed system persists.  States maintain an appreciable, yet diminished degree of 
autonomy.  The presidential election is largely decided by the popular vote, albeit within 51 
individual contests, hence several notable exceptions.  Notwithstanding these outliers, the 
President must “merit the confidence of the people as they exercise the immense powers of their 
office.”24  	
 No longer insulated from the people, the president, like the Senate, may be unable to 
check and control the passions of the moment, unless he sacrifices public support.  The president 
has become increasingly reliant on popular opinion and politically safe decisions to govern, lest 
his programs and policies risk losing Congress or even his own office.  Jeffrey Tulis labels this 
as the “rhetorical president,” arguing, “The doctrine that a president ought to be a popular leader 
has become an unquestioned remise of our political culture.”  Describing these changes as “a 
profound development in American politics,” Tulis explains that it is also a relatively recent 
phenomenon, a “twentieth-century invention,” having begun with Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson, and, for that matter, explicitly proscribed in earlier periods.25  
The rise of primaries has only facilitated these trends.  Since 1968, primaries have 
become more decisive in choosing presidential nominees.  At times, these contests tend to be less 
representative of the nation as a whole, and therefore, appeals to the needs and interests of select 
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primary voters may provide an unfair advantage to them over citizens in other states.26  
Additionally, voting and campaigning consume nearly a year of the presidential term, to say 
nothing of raising money or building an organization.  As primaries have crept earlier in the 
calendar year, and the so-called “invisible primary” has gained in importance, additional time, 
attention, and energy must be devoted to election.27    
 Another dramatic development of the Presidency has been its enormous growth of power 
and authority.  The Framers had wanted an executive which would be independent and strong, 
but limited in its scope, enforcing the laws passed by the national legislature.  However, almost 
immediately, strong leaders infused greater power and vigor into the executive.  President 
Andrew Jackson wielded the veto countless times and waged war on the Second Bank of the US, 
actions viewed as tyrannical at the time, if constitutional.   	
 While the Congress has, at times, resisted encroachments, more often than not, they have 
willingly conceded such authority to the Presidency.  Periods of war and crises have witnessed 
the enlargement of the National Government, and in particular, the Presidency.  Since World 
War II, the president has become intricately involved in the legislative process, economic affairs, 
and the management of a vast bureaucracy of federal agencies and programs.  Robert Higgs 
argues, “The war left the United States … a powerful, highly arbitrary, activist government 
virtually unchecked by the constitutional limitations of checks and balances.”28  Additionally, the 
president has issued executive orders to alter government policy, either in the absence of 
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congressional action or outright against it.29  As Sanford Levinson suggests, “The present 
Constitution … seems to offer an open invitation for those who would defend something close to 
presidential dictatorship.”30  George Carey describes these developments as “derangement of 
functions,” explaining that, “The president has emerged over the decades as the ‘chief legislator,’ 
as the one who sets down the legislative agenda to a far greater extent than the Congressional 
leadership.  In the area of foreign affairs he stands almost alone with what now seems an 
authority to commit American armed forces at his sole discretion.”31 (Carey 628-629)	
 The expansion of Executive power has, at times, posed risks to such areas as rights 
protections.  Examples abound where presidential action has had harmful effects on civil 
liberties, such as during World War II, when President Roosevelt interred Japanese-American 
civilians with the explicit consent of the Supreme Court.  Such violations may persist so long as 
an unchecked executive exercises his authority with impunity and disregard for the Constitution.   
 
3.4  The Supreme Court 
 The Supreme Court was designed to be insulated and entrenched, with Justices selected 
by the president and approved by the Senate to serve life tenure.  It has withstood attempts to 
recall or elect their members, grant to them limited terms, or subject their decisions to the 
judgment of the people.  Despite the Court’s continued stability and independence, its role in the 
political system has dramatically evolved.  Originally slated to determine the constitutionality of 
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legislation, the Supreme Court has witnessed its judicial scope expand, dedicating itself to rights 
protection and becoming, in many respects, the sole arbiter of constitutional issues.   
 The Court’s expanded scope has also ensured that judicial supremacy would prevail over 
judicial restraint.  In the years before the Civil War, departmentalism was strong.  Each branch of 
government had been entitled its own interpretation of the Constitution.  States maintained this 
prerogative as well, as exampled by the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, where both 
state legislatures declared the Alien and Sedition Acts to be unconstitutional, and enlisted the 
reasoned opinion of fellow states.32   
After the Civil War, amendments and political mobilization became the principle method 
whereby constitutional change could be enacted, but the Court became increasingly important as 
well.  In the wake of a weakened executive and the decline of departmentalism, the Supreme 
Court began to assert and expand its authority, eventually becoming the prime interpreter of the 
Constitution, and in many respects, the clearest channel for any constitutional change.   
 As the Court has become stronger vis-à-vis other governing institutions, and its scope 
expanded beyond that which it had traditionally exercised, it has issued rulings which have 
conflicted with state prerogatives and civil liberties.  For example, the Lochner v. New York 
(1905) case witnessed the Court overturn state legislation regulating working hours for bakers 
because it determined the law violated the “liberty of contract,” a right which the Justices 
deemed most essential.33  
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At times, the Court has been accused of prescribing policy recommendations to Congress, 
in effect, legislating.34  By crafting programmatic legislation, the Court may be co-opting 
representative institutions in their official capacities to debate issues in a public venue, 
weakening the republican form of government.  Elected officials are intended to be accountable 
for their support and opposition to policies, yet unelected judges have advanced programs 
beyond their purview.  For example, the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) specified that 
abortion should remain legal in all but the third trimester of a pregnancy, determining it to be the 
wisest and most reasonable approach.35 
 Finally, observers have argued that the Supreme Court has rendered judgments, despite 
the lack of a national consensus.  States have their own particularities and local dispositions.  As 
such, issues, such as religion, speech, morality, and public health had been reserved for states to 
regulate according to their own norms.  However, as the federal government has increasingly co-
opted state responsibilities, the Court began to flex its authority, issuing national standards to 
address unsettled constitutional, political, and social questions.  The Roe v. Wade decision 
permitted abortion to be legal nationwide, even though only four states had fully legalized 
abortion, while another thirteen made available conditional abortion.36  Jeffrey Rosen explains 
that decision “overturned political compromises that national majorities supported, provoking 
dramatic political backlashes.”37  Similarly, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court permitted same-
sex marriage in all 50 states, while only 37 had legalized the practice, most of which by judicial 																																																								
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fiat and not legislative or popular action, a point not lost in Chief Justice John Roberts’ 
dissenting opinion.38  While abortion and same-sex marriage were achieved legally and 
politically across the nation, their societal acceptance remains challenging.  Political institutions 
have had very limited influence or control over the social discrimination and resistance that has 
ensued.     
 The development of the Supreme Court has had the long-term effect on the political 
engagement of citizens.  With political mobilization, representative institutions, and state action 
all subject to judicial veto, one can argue that the civic responsibilities of society have been 
passed to the judiciary.  This dynamic does not necessarily foster a workable republican regime 
that can effectively manage societal conflict within the prescribed mechanisms and channels.  
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 The “Unfounding” period has witnessed the constitutional principles of the Framers 
become undone.  Democratization in the form of primaries and popular elections has rendered 
the republican form of government increasingly more responsive to the people.  It may have also 
diminished the independence of the Senate and the Presidency, ensuring their greater dependence 
on public opinion.  Institutional development, namely in the form of a more powerful executive 
and a Supreme Court with an expanded judicial scope, has challenged the balance of powers.  In 
particular, the actions of the Court have, at times, had effects on the legitimacy of representative 
institutions and degree of societal divisions.  With the mechanisms and channels unable to fulfill 
their constitutional purposes, and citizens losing faith in the legitimacy, dependability, and trust 
of their institutions, the risks of constitutional dysfunction may necessarily arise. 																																																								
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CHAPTER FOUR: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
As gridlock, overly-partisan politics, and impotent institutions have become pervasive, 
some analysts have sought to link these problems to the Constitution, arguing they are 
manifestations of constitutional dysfunction.  As explained in “Chapter One,” Thomas Mann and 
Norm Ornstein present a portrait of extensive political dysfunction in the United States, 
implicating gridlock, political polarization, the filibuster, unlimited campaign contributions, 
extremist Republican tendencies, and sensationalist media.  Unfortunately, their constitutional 
framework is tenuous.  They neither adequately explain how constitutional development may be 
complicit nor offer a constitutional metric by which to judge the political discord.   
 In light of these developments, many have offered constitutional solutions to address the 
perceived dysfunction.  Among the suggested remedies include further democratization, outright 
constitutional disobedience, or a restoration of original principles.  While these proposals merit 
attention, they might not sufficiently resolve the constitutional dysfunction that has materialized, 
namely the inability of institutions and mechanisms to fulfill their constitutional purposes via 
constitutional means, often because they either misdiagnose the problem or overcompensate for 
potential weaknesses.   
 
4.1  Democratic Aspirationalism 
The fundamental assumption of democratic aspirationalism is that the Constitution is 
inherently undemocratic.  Robert Dahl has argued for reinterpreting and redefining the 
Constitution’s purpose, suggesting that it should advance “political equality,” democratic 
participation, and the protection of “rights, liberties, and opportunities.”1  Far from eroding the 																																																								
1	Robert	A.	Dahl,	How	Democratic	Is	the	American	Constitution?,	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2003),	139.	
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principles of the Constitution, Dahl argues that democratization has instead made a fairer, more 
participatory nation, raising the people’s expectations and demands of their government.  The 
Constitution, however, has not kept pace with this evolution, remaining a barrier to the fullest 
realization of democratic ideals.  Dahl claims, “The legitimacy of the Constitution ought to 
derive solely from its utility as an instrument of democratic government.”2  So long as it fails to 
promote these principles, he warns, “The beliefs of Americans in [its] legitimacy … will remain 
… in constant tension with their beliefs in the legitimacy of democracy.”3 
 To address these deficiencies, democratic aspirationalists have recommended that the 
United States enact further democratization, specifically by establishing a more majoritarian 
government.  Mechanisms and procedures should be implemented which better reflect the will of 
the voters and the sentiment of the people.  To that end, several have advocated for adopting a 
parliamentary system.  Frustrated by a lack of vigor in government, Woodrow Wilson had 
originally favored developing the United States into a parliamentary system.  He argued: 
 
Our Constitution, like every other constitution which puts the authority to make laws and 
the duty of controlling the public expenditure into the hands of a popular assembly, 
practically sets that assembly to rule the affairs of the nation as supreme overlord.  But, 
by separating it entirely from its executive agencies, it deprives it of the opportunity and 
means for making its authority complete and convenient.4  
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Wilson bemoaned the “present…federal government” for “lack[ing] strength because its powers 
are divided … promptness because its authorities are multiplied … wieldiness because its 
processes are roundabout [and] efficiency because its responsibility is indistinct and its action 
without competent direction.”5 
 James MacGregor Burns similarly advocates for a parliamentary-like political regime.  
Advancing the notion of a strong executive within the framework of a durable party system, 
Burns ties together “vigorous presidential leadership, strong programmatic orientation, and 
strong party foundation plus strong party opposition” to help foster a more efficient, effective, 
and responsible government.  As with Wilson, Burns does not favor separation of powers and 
divided government, positing that parties should serve to facilitate “teamwork in government.”6   
Mann and Ornstein agree, on the whole, with adopting a Parliamentary government, and 
propose that adequate filibuster reform and greater executive oversight and control be enacted.7  
Further, they conclude, “A Westminster-style parliamentary system provides a much cleaner 
form of democratic accountability than the American system.”8  Dahl concurs, adding that such a 
system “combines the advantages of district elections with the fairness of proportionality.”9   
Ultimately, Wilson, Burns, Dahl, and other advocates for a Parliamentary system argue, 
in essence, for concentrating authority into the national government, particularly the executive, 
with fewer divided powers so as to allow an efficient and seamless government operation, while 
ensuring that responsible governing institutions be sufficiently accountable to the people.     
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 Others have recommended that existing government institutions be preserved, but 
rendered less entrenched and more responsive, further enlarging democratic accountability.  For 
example, Sanford Levinson believes that an eighteen-year term for Justices of the Supreme Court 
and all federal judges ought to be applied.  It’s “the only relatively sure way to limit politically 
timed resignations … [and] the only practical way to prevent judges from narcissistically 
remaining on the bench” beyond their capacities.10  Such a proposal would represent the first 
significant reform of the Supreme Court, the sole branch of the national government which has 
remained deeply entrenched.      
 Additionally, democratic aspirationalists have expanded the understanding of rights to 
encompass empowerments from the state.  Dahl has tied political and social rights, such as 
voting, protesting, speech and assembly, to an equal pursuit of opportunity.  Chiding the Buckley 
v. Valeo decision, Dahl believes the Justices incorrectly understood the foundations of American 
democracy.  Whereas the Court recognized campaign contributions and expenditures as freedom 
of speech, itself a First Amendment protection of individuals from unnecessary government 
restriction, Dahl conceptualizes the regime as “deriv[ing] its legitimacy from the principles of 
political equality,” and, as such, demands a government actively guarantee opportunity and 
adequate resources for all citizens.  As he argues, “Citizens must … possess the minimal 
resources that are necessary in order to take advantage of the opportunities and to exercise their 
rights.”11 
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 Unfortunately, it would seem that further democratization may facilitate the trends which 
have led to constitutional dysfunction.  Certain branches of government, such as the Senate and 
the Presidency, have become institutionally more responsive to popular currents.  Establishing a 
Parliamentary system whereby those checks were abolished would invite a majoritarian-based 
government.  With a government entirely dependent upon the approval of the people to continue 
governing, it could find it challenging to render politically difficult or unpopular decisions, 
perhaps undermining its own effectiveness.  As Madison warned, there is a “propensity of all 
single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be 
seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.”12  It is worth 
considering whether popular, politically-safe decisions are always in the best interest of the 
nation.   
 The effects of a parliamentary system on institutional stability also warrant attention.  It 
may be argued that subjecting the entire government to a single election within the span of 
several years could exacerbate political whiplash.  Without the staggered terms of the Senate and 
the Presidency, incremental, gradual changes to government are lost.  Mann and Ornstein 
concede that constant fluctuations of the electorate have proven problematic.  They posit, 
“Democracy’s most essential power - the ability of the citizenry to ‘throw the bums out’ - proved 
wholly inadequate to the task of governing effectively.”13  As they further explain, “The public is 
perpetuating the source of its discontent [by] electing a new group of people who are even less 
inclined to or capable of crafting compromise or solutions to pressing problems.”14  Madison 
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shared such concerns, determining that a second legislative body was necessary for the stability 
it offered.  As he argued: 
 
The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, 
however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some 
stable institution in the government.  Every new election in the States is found to change 
one half of the representatives.  From this change of men must proceed a change of 
opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures.  But a continual change 
even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of 
success.15 
 
It is difficult to see how a Parliamentary system resolves some of the drivers of 
constitutional dysfunction, such as political polarization.  In the absence of divided government 
and Senate rules, such as filibuster, consensus building may become more difficult, particularly 
for a people as politically divided as in the United States.   
Arend Lijphart describes the British system as a “government-versus-opposition model,” 
shaped by adversarial, rather than coalescent politics, although he explains that the UK has, at 
times, consulted, even incorporated, minority parties “on critical issues instead of simply 
outvoting them.” 16  Indeed, the opposition has been institutionalized by shadow cabinets, which 
provide leadership and policy to parties out of government.  However, they do not wield any 
formal power.  The very essence of a parliamentary system is that the Prime Minister, as 
executive, commands the support of a majority in the Parliament, if not a coalition.  Opposition 																																																								
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parties cannot institutionally check the actions of the executive to the extent that they can in the 
US divided-government model.  In the UK, for example, governments have suffered periodic 
defeats in Parliament, but these tend to be the exceptions to the rule.  Many occurred “when the 
government had either no majority or a very small majority,” while others were “symbolic only,” 
having little “impact in terms of change of policy.” 17  
Further, Lijphart argues that, while the most stable systems are ones with homogenous 
societies, the UK remains an exception, having governed a diverse and plural society of four 
nations.18  Nonetheless, British policy of “devolution,” the ceding of authority to local 
governments, and the Scottish national movement toward independence, have since challenged 
the claims of the British regime to rule over peoples beyond the English border.19    	
Reforms proposed by Levinson which aim to preserve the existing US system, but uproot 
entrenched institutions, such as the Supreme Court, may not sufficiently address or resolve the 
fundamental issue of an expanded judicial scope, either.  Instead, it might serve to hasten the 
Court’s responsiveness to political trends, as well as changes to its composition.  In short, greater 
democratic accountability may not remedy the constitutional dysfunction that has plagued the 
American system.  To the contrary, institutional instability has resulted from overly-accountable 
institutions.        
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4.2  Constitutional Disobedience 
 While many have advocated extensive reforms, they are often within the framework of 
changing the Constitution.  Others, however, have suggested governing institutions exercise 
outright disobedience to provisions of the text.  Louis Michael Seidman believes “our obsession 
with the Constitution has saddled us with a dysfunctional political system.”20  He finds that 
constitutional fealty unnecessarily restricts the actions and behavior of the Presidency, Congress, 
and the Supreme Court.  As such, he argues that the contract of the Constitution ought not to 
bind subsequent generations.  “If there is authentic conflict between what an actor wants at two 
different times,” he asserts, “we need an account for why an earlier decision is wiser, or more 
just, or better reflects the actor’s actual preferences than a later decision.”  Seidman, concluding 
that the values and principles of the Framers, which are embodied by the Constitution, do not 
align with those of contemporary Americans, asks, “The framers of the American Constitution 
understood very little about modern America.  Why are their uninformed preferences better than 
our informed ones?”21 
  Rather, Seidman rejects the limits imposed by the “dead hand” of the Framers, 
suggesting that a deliberative, “all-things-considered judgment” be decided, and if this “just, or 
wise, or prudent” option is unconstitutional, then the nation’s governing institutions should opt 
for it regardless.22  As he explains: 
Imagine that after careful study a government official — say, the president or one of the 
party leaders in Congress — reaches a considered judgment that a particular course of 
action is best for the country. Suddenly, someone bursts into the room with new 																																																								
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information: a group of white propertied men who have been dead for two centuries, 
knew nothing of our present situation, acted illegally under existing law and thought it 
was fine to own slaves might have disagreed with this course of action. Is it even 
remotely rational that the official should change his or her mind because of this 
divination?23 
For the most part, Seidman believes the path sanctioned by the Constitution would prove 
sufficient and the most prudent.  “We will therefore continue our current practices not because 
we are compelled to do so but because our all-things-considered judgment is that this is the best 
way to proceed.”24  Nonetheless, he insists that a continued adherence to the Constitution for its 
own sake may unduly allow “some people [to] exercise power over other people,” without being 
obligated to offer a substantive, coherent defense of the status quo.  “Instead, they are 
empowered to say ‘no’ just because of words written on very old parchment.”25  For Seidman, 
this is “deeply authoritarian,” antithetical to the values of an open and free society, and 
degrading to the political discourse.26  
While abiding by the Constitution might, at times, provide the most prudent judgment, 
disobedience to certain provisions may offer a better alternative.  As Seidman highlights, “It is as 
old as the Republic.”  Instances abound of such disobedience throughout American history, from 
the discarding of the Articles of Confederation in 1787, to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, 
to Brown v. Board of Education, when Justice Robert Jackson ruled in favor of desegregation, 
“although he thought it had no basis in the Constitution.”27  
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However, if constitutional disobedience were permitted, it may weaken regime 
legitimacy and the long-term dependability of the Constitution.  The document authorizes the 
appropriate governing power to specific institutions.  Indeed, as Seidman asks, “Without a 
constitution, how are ‘we’ to express our decision to … have or not have a Supreme Court?  
How would ‘we’ decide which institutions were authoritative?”  He posits that Americans “may 
well be … satisfied with their existing institutions and the results those institutions produce,”28 
insisting elsewhere that the “existence of these institutions” would not change, rather “the basis 
on which they claim legitimacy.”29  However, it might be difficult for distinctly separate 
governing institutions to survive in the absence of constitutional boundaries.  A society which 
pursues constitutional disobedience may be more prone to momentary passions and urges, 
shifting the loci of power and authority to those institutions which reflect the immediate interests 
of the majority class.  For example, as democracy took root in the United Kingdom, the powers 
of the House of Commons grew, while those of the House of Lords were curtailed, as 
dramatically illustrated by the Parliament Act of 1911.  	
 Further, such developments may endanger the rights of citizens, as well, in particular 
those who belong to a minority political party, class, or race.  Seidman minimizes the risk, 
claiming, “The only real protection for civil liberties is an engaged and tolerant public willing to 
respect and defend minority rights.”30  While he is correct to point out that a societal component 
to tolerance is crucial for a polity to value civil liberties, he neglects to mention that it was the 
limited nature of the Constitution which was intended to protect rights.  Constitutional 
disobedience may, in effect, create an unlimited constitution.   
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4.3  Restoring the Constitution 
Democratic aspirationalism and constitutional disobedience share the fundamental 
assumption that the Framers’ values and decisions are inadequate for contemporary Americans.  
However, several others have argued that, to the contrary, the original design of the Constitution 
remains pertinent, and advocate for a restoration of these principles.  Mark Levin does not 
believe that "the Constitution, as originally structured, is outdated and outmoded.”  Rather, he 
feels the national government has become too strong, the separation of powers unbalanced, and 
the role of the states greatly diminished.  The greatest threat to representative government and 
society emanates from “the growing authoritarianism of a federal Leviathan.”31 
In redressing these problems, Levin has proposed several amendments to the 
Constitution.  Firstly, these amendments would strengthen states. For Levin, the states provide 
the foundation for the entire political system, asserting, “The states established the American 
Republic, and, through the Constitution, retained for themselves significant authority to ensure 
the republic’s durability.”32  As such, they ought to be empowered to reassert their role in the 
regime.   
Deriding the 17th Amendment, the direct election of Senators, as serving “the interests of 
the governing masterminds and their disciples,” Levin has proposed to repeal it.  With state 
legislatures re-equipped to select their own Senators, he believes bicameralism would be 
strengthened, ensuring the Senate serve as a “counterweight or check on lawmaking,” and 
fostering “a more rational, reflective, and collaborative legislating process.”  Repeal, however, 
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would not go far enough.  Levin has further suggested that state legislatures be provided the 
power to recall a sitting Senator “for any reason.”33 
Additionally, Levin’s amendments would have the effect of controlling and checking the 
authority of the national government.  Some of these proposals serve to strengthen states as well, 
as with his suggestion that three-fifths of state legislatures wield a veto over federal statutes and 
regulation, within a two-year period of implementation.  As he argues, “Federalism … is about 
states serving … as an essential buffer between the central government and the people, 
safeguarding the citizen from authoritarianism’s consolidated rule.”34  
While the “Leviathan” of national government must be checked, Levin views the 
insulated and powerful Supreme Court as especially dangerous.  To ensure the Court “be 
independent in its judicial deliberations but not supreme in all matters,” Levin suggests that its 
Justices be limited to twelve-year terms; a Congressional veto of all judicial opinions by a three-
fifths vote; and state veto of judicial decisions by a three-fifths margin.  These reforms would 
“return the Court to its proper foundational role within a republican system of government.”35  
Finally, Levin believes that term limits should be applied to members of Congress, as 
well.  This would serve to curb professional politicians, better connect representatives to the 
citizenry, and render them more responsive to the needs of the people.36  
While Levin’s focus on restoring original constitutional principles properly identifies 
some of the sources of constitutional dysfunction, his remedies may overcompensate for 
perceived deficiencies.  Repeal of the 17th Amendment would strengthen the balance between the 
states and the federal government, redressing the influence which had been lost since ratification.  																																																								
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However, permitting a state recall of Senators for any reason may undermine that balance.  This 
power had been exercised by states under the Articles of Confederation, and was explicitly 
withheld from the new government at the Convention.37  It would potentially add another 
dimension of majoritarianism to legislating.  With Senators constantly pressured to placate state 
legislators, their independence may be compromised.  Further, as removals or recalls constantly 
beckon, Senators would, in effect, be subjected to multiple elections during a single term. 
  Similarly, a state veto over federal statutes would fundamentally invert the formula of 
federalism and the supremacy of the national government.  The Framers had wanted the national 
government to check the excesses of state legislatures, vesting it with the necessary and proper 
powers to effectively enforce the law.38  Shackling the federal government to the states may 
complicate these duties. 
Levin’s proposal to afford a congressional and state veto over judicial decisions may not 
differ significantly in form from the amendment process, whereby Congress and state 
legislatures ratify formal constitutional change.  However, it might risk unsettling the 
Constitution by making changes a routinized aspect of government.  Madison had hoped a stable, 
long-term regime would instill reverence among the people, and therefore, advocated for a 
gradual, considered approach to change.39  Levin’s amendment could lose that sense of caution 
in its immediacy and regularity of action.  
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 Additionally, the joint congressional-state veto could inject a degree of popular opinion 
into the decisions of the Supreme Court, in effect, rendering judicial bodies out of representative 
institutions, which should be concerned with legislating.  The Court was intended to be insulated 
and entrenched so as to preserve its independence, and, therefore, suggested reforms may be 
more effective limiting judicial scope rather than judicial independence.40   
 Finally, it is important consider the effects of congressional term limits.  The House of 
Representatives was designed to embody the spirit of democracy, ensuring “an immediate 
dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people.41  The sentiment of the people is to 
prevail in matters pertaining to their congressional representation.  As such, the best term limit 
can be made by the decision of the voter.  Placing a restriction on that choice may rob 
constituents of that right.42     
Further, the assumption that term limits would counter incumbent advantage, such as 
name recognition and substantial fundraising prowess, has been called into question.  Thomas 
Mann has not found that term limits would appreciably lead to more competitive House races.  
Rather, he argues, “a term limit would very likely turn into a floor, with would-be candidates 
deferring their challenge and awaiting the involuntary retirement of the incumbent,” at which 
point, “elections would be contested only in open seats, and then only those not safe for one 
political party or the other.” 43 
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4.4  Conclusion 
 To address the constitutional dysfunction that has plagued the nation, analysts and 
scholars have proposed several solutions, each predicated upon widely divergent diagnoses of 
the source of the problems.  Democratic aspirationalists, such as Dahl and Levinson, have 
criticized the Constitution’s undemocratic nature as presenting serious challenges to its 
legitimacy in an increasingly democratic society.  As such, they primarily advocate that 
institutions be more accountable to the people, while centralizing the loci of power, perhaps in a 
single legislature as in a Parliamentary system.  However, overly accountable institutions have 
been responsible for much of the institutional instability that has persisted.  Others, such as 
Seidman, believe provisions of the Constitution impede the ability for governing institutions to 
choose the most appropriate policy.  He suggess that constitutional disobedience ought to be 
considered these decisions conflict with constitutional barriers.  However, such an approach may 
create an unlimited constitution, inviting questions over institutional legitimacy.  Still others, 
such as Levin, have argued for a return to original constitutional principles.  While Levin 
accurately identifies the source of much constitutional dysfunction, several of his proposals may 
be counterproductive, and ultimately, fall short of restoring constitutional principles.  For 
example, by injecting majoritarianism into the decision-making and shackling the federal 
government to the states, these amendments may weaken the independence and stability of the 
national government.  My recommended approach weighs these various critiques of the 
Constitution and seeks to offer substantive proposals that properly diagnose the sources of 
dysfunction, while presenting sufficient reforms to address it.    
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CHAPTER FIVE: MANAGING DEMOCRACY: A PATH FORWARD 
 
Having defined constitutional dysfunction in “Chapter One” as the degree to which 
institutions impair the attainment of constitutional purposes, having explored institutional “drift” 
in “Chapter Three,” and having assessed the various prescriptions to American constitutional 
dysfunction in “Chapter Four,” from democratization to a restoration of constitutional principles, 
it is now useful to consider viable remedies to constitutional dysfunction.  The republican form 
of government provided the cornerstone to regime legitimacy.  As such, we can examine how 
institutions may be reformed so as to restore representative government.  This need not entail 
undoing the democratic revolution, such as repeal of the 17th Amendment, but rather by 
appropriately managing democracy.  To buttress institutional stability, measures could be 
considered which counteract the effects of frequent wave elections and the ensuing political 
whiplash, so that branches are durable for the long-term.  Further, we might seek to highlight 
methods which preserve the efficacy and independence of the national government, but ensure a 
limited scope of power.  Finally, we may need to address reforms which strengthen societal 
cohesion, as well.        
 
5.1  Stabilizing the Congress  
 The House of Representatives was intended to be the most responsive branch of the 
national government, hence the two-year terms.1  However, these were still longer than the 
annual elections which had predominated in the state legislatures at the time.2  Therefore, the 
two-year term represented a compromise between democratic accountability and institutional 																																																								
1	James	Madison,	“Federalist	No.	52,”	in	The	Federalist	Papers,	ed.	Isaac	Kramnick	(London:	Penguin	Group,	1987),	
323-324.	
2	“Biennial	Elections,”	History,	Art	&	Archives,	United	States	House	of	Representatives,	accessed	March	7,	2016,	
URL:	http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Biennial-Elections/.	
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stability.  As primaries have gained in import in deciding nominees for office, congressional 
members have been increasingly subjected to additional elections during their term, arguably 
rendering the office more democratic.    
 To rebalance stability, a three-year term for House members may be appropriate.  It 
would counteract the entire year congressmen must devote to campaigning for re-election, 
offering additional time for legislating and governing.  As Larry Sabato argues:  
 
Two years once made sense, with governing consuming three quarters of the time and the 
reelection campaign one quarter. Those estimates are now reversed, at least for the 
minority of House members who have competitive contests. And for congressmen in 
“safe” districts, their natural insecurity about reelection has encouraged them to spend 
enormous time away from legislating on the all-consuming task of building large war 
chests, in order to ward off future challengers.3 
 
James Madison concurred.  At the Convention, he had argued that a three-year term afforded 
institutional stability and instilled greater knowledge for representatives.4  
While lengthening the terms of House of Representatives may stabilize it against 
successive wave elections and political whiplash, it would not unduly hamstring representative 
democracy.  Even developed parliamentary systems often have terms greater than two years in 
length.  The United Kingdom, which only recently established a five-year term for Parliament, 
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has not had a government shorter than four years since 1974.5  Similarly, Germany’s 
governments have usually lasted between three and four years, and not a single one shorter than 
three since World War II.6  
 The Senate was established to check the decisions of the House of Representatives and 
popular majorities.  To that end, the Framers opted for longer terms of six years, as well as 
selection by state legislatures.  This arrangement was intended to assure the necessary stability 
and fortitude to withstand the whims of popular opinion, with a focus on the long-term interests 
of the nation.7  However, with the ratification of the 17th Amendment, the ballots of the voters 
displaced the choice of state legislatures.  The Senate was rendered a more democratic 
institution, “more responsive, by definition less deliberative.”8  Since 1914, it has actually shifted 
party control more frequently than the House, and has been subjected to similar wave elections, 
political whiplash, and partisan primaries as the lower body.9  Further, direct election “has not 
appreciably increased the Senate’s responsiveness or efficiency.”10 
 Restoring the Senate to its original character would entail counterbalancing these 
democratic developments.   Although repeal of the 17th Amendment, as proposed by Mark Levin, 
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may provide a degree of insularity, it would unnecessarily undue the democratic expansion of 
suffrage.  The right to elect a Senator has become understood as vital by many Americans.  As 
Adam Cohen argues, “Repealing the 17th Amendment would prevent the little people — in other 
words, the voters — from having their say.11  As such, it may be unwise to revoke it.12  
Since the method of selecting Senators should remain direct election, then a feasible 
approach would be to lengthen their terms to nine years.  While nine years may appear too long, 
it must be noted a number of Framers had suggested rather lengthy terms.  Madison had 
originally favored seven years, while Roger Wilson had recommended nine years.13  In an age 
where primaries have subjected members to multiple elections within a given term, and where 
political whiplash has ravaged the stability of the institution, nine years may counteract the 
symptoms of an overly-responsive branch.  Additionally, if the terms of the House of 
Representatives are lengthened to three years, then the nine-year Senatorial term preserves the 
staggered, gradual approach to changing the Senate, with one-third of its members subject to a 
vote each election.       
 
5.2  Restoring the Presidency 
 The Framers sought an executive with sufficient independence as to be effective in 
executing the laws.14  They decided against entrusting its selection to the National Legislature, 
nor to the people.  Instead, they opted for electors, who originally were chosen by state 																																																								
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legislatures.  However, as the Electoral College became a de facto popular vote, and primaries 
decisive in nominating candidates, presidents have become more dependent upon the people for 
election, and once in office, they have relied increasingly on popular support to govern, which 
Jeffrey Tulis describes as the “rhetorical president.”15 
 Affording to the president a single, six-year term may restore the necessary independence 
to govern effectively.  This proposal minimizes the number of presidential elections, completely 
removing re-election entirely.  However, it may also be of adequate length to ensure efficacious 
governance.  Larry Sabato, who supports a six-year term, but with an added two-year extension 
to be awarded by a referendum, explains that a six-year term avoids the “time wasting” and 
“pressures” of reelection.  Instead, a president would be permitted to devote more attention to 
governing.  As Sabato explains, “Without the possibility of reelection, presidents would have no 
motive to postpone controversial decisions, and their critics would be deprived of the frequently 
heard complaint that the occupant of the White House took specific actions just to ensure his 
reelection.”  Further, the additional two years allows the president “a chance to follow up on 
their most important policies,” as well as buttressing “personal relationships with other nations’ 
leaders.”16 
  Bruce Buchanan raises a particular concern with this proposal, asking, “What is to 
replace public support as the enabling energy of the presidency?”  Highlighting the lack of 
political potency of term-limited presidents, so-called “lame ducks,” he suggests that no viable 
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alternative would provide the suitable “empowering vitality” that public support offers when re-
election is viable.17    
It should be noted that congressional midterm elections would still remain.  The single, 
six-year term is an approach which strengthens the presidency without weakening the other 
branches of government.  Removing re-election may enhance the role of the Congress.  The 
institutional third-year midterm would offer the most immediate recourse by the people in 
passing judgment on the president.  Representative government, not popular democracy, is 
strengthened.     
Further, a president may be driven to buttress their legacy, much as second-term “lame 
duck” presidents have done.  President Dwight Eisenhower helped establish the American space 
program during his second term, while working cautiously on stabilizing US-Soviet relations.18  
President Ronald Reagan signed the INF Treaty during his second term, and similarly sought 
closer ties, both diplomatically and personally, with Mikhail Gorbachev.19  In addition, 
presidents might determine that the most viable means of safeguarding their accomplishments is 
by ensuring that their party maintains control over the White House once they have stepped 
down, thereby engaging in electoral politics.20   
A strong Executive, however, had only been tenable so long as it was limited in scope.  If 
the president is afforded a single, six-year term, thereby restoring its independence, then it is 
useful to assess how to sufficiently limit executive power.  The Framers anticipated that any 																																																								
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individual who occupied the office would seek greater power.  Indeed, the entire framework for 
separation of powers was predicated on ambition.21  However, it fails to work when other 
institutions either lack that necessary counterweight, or willingly cede it.     
Throughout American history, the powers of the executive have expanded.  This has been 
particularly true during war and crises.  Oftentimes, the Congress has willingly acquiesced in the 
growth of executive authority, outright ceding power.22  This has enabled the President to issue 
executive orders, either in defiance of Congress, or in their absence.  For example, in 1954, 
President Eisenhower, who was pushing for freer international trade, requested Congress lower 
the price differential offered to US defensive supply firms.  “When Congress refused … the 
president issued an executive order reducing the price advantage given to U.S. companies by a 
considerable margin.”23 
Since congressional action has often, although not entirely, been responsible for the 
growth of executive power, then it may be necessary for Congress to become more proactive in 
restoring the balance of power.  The debate on where legislative responsibility ends and 
executive authority begins will almost certainly continue.  It represents a healthy political and 
constitutional struggle between two governing institutions.  Therefore, it is worth examining how 
Congress can reassert itself and reclaim lost authority, such as executive orders.  If a president 
has issued an executive order which establishes new policy in the absence of legislative 
approval, then the latter may want to consider taking explicit action, even if it supports the 
program.  Such an approach could permit the Congress to serve an integral role in the process.   
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5.3  Limiting Judicial Scope 
 The Supreme Court was designed to be insulated and entrenched, with its selection 
removed from the people and life tenure for all members.  The Framers had believed this would 
assure the requisite independence to exercise the judicial functions of the nation.24  However, an 
independent Court was only palatable providing that its powers were largely limited in scope.  
As Hamilton warned, “The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be 
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”25  Yet the scope of judicial authority 
witnessed considerable expansion, particularly in the years following the Civil War.  Critics have 
alleged that the Court has engaged in “judicial activism,” a complex term which Cass Sunstein 
succinctly defines as “an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the 
political branches of government,”26 such as the Lochner v. New York (1905) decision.27   
 In an effort to address such “judicial activism,” it might be beneficial if the Court retain 
its current arrangement, insulated and entrenched, so as to preserve its independence.  Instead of 
subjecting the Justices to elections, or their decisions to a referendum, needlessly inviting 
majorities, members could instead practice judicial restraint.  An independent Court with limited 
scope may more faithfully restore the institution to the principles which the Framers had sought.   
 The judicial philosophy of James Bradley Thayer, a Harvard professor, best encapsulates 
the understanding behind judicial restraint.  Thayer’s writings greatly influenced Justice Felix 
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Frankfurter, who readily quoted Thayer in his decisions.28  They believed representative bodies 
and legislatures served an important role in the polity, and, because they were accountable 
directly to the people, their decisions had to be respected by the courts.  As Thayer had written, 
“And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are careless or evil, yet the constitutional 
duty of the court remains untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect the people by 
undertaking a function not its own … The judiciary … owe to the country no greater or clearer 
duty than that of keeping their hands off these acts wherever it is possible to do it.”29  
 The concerns of an expanded judiciary were not limited to their effects on legislatures.  
Thayer had warned that an expanded judicial scope could have repercussions on society.  As 
Thayer, quoted by Frankfurter in an opinion, explained: 
 
[An expanded judiciary] is always attended with a serious evil,  namely that the 
correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the 
political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the 
question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors … But I venture to think 
that the good which came … from the vigorous thinking that had to be done in the 
political debates that followed, from the infiltration through every part of the population 
of sound ideas and sentiments, from the rousing into activity of opposite elements, the 
enlargement of ideas, the strengthening of moral fiber, and the growth of political 
experience that came out of it all -- that all this far more than outweighed any evil which 
ever flowed from the refusal of the court to interfere with the work of the legislature.30 																																																								
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Judicial restraint only would not guarantee a limited judiciary.  Other institutions, such as 
the Congress, have responsibilities as well.  George Lovell and Scott Lemieux have researched 
“legislative defaults,” instances where Congress has passed important, yet divisive questions, 
such as abortion policy, to the judiciary so as not to incur the costs of making unpopular 
decisions.31  Accordingly, the Congress may seek to fulfill its obligations to the people by 
rendering decisions on these matters, themselves.  It offers an opportunity to limit the scope of 
the judiciary, restore the balance of powers, and strengthen representative government.   
 
5.4  Revisiting the Amendment Process 
 Amendments have served as one of the principal means by reformers to achieve 
nationwide success.  Prior to the Civil War, amendments were few and far between, yet in the 
wake of the conflict, their numbers burgeoned.  Michael Vorenberg notes that their quality had 
differed, as well.  “These were not simply measures restraining the federal government,” he 
explains.  Rather, the Civil War-Reconstruction era amendments “empowered … the federal 
government,” becoming the method by which “to accomplish major social reforms, such as the 
abolition of slavery, the regulation of marriage … and the prohibition of alcohol.”32  Additional 
amendments to the Constitution, however, have fallen off in the last several decades. 
 Many analysts have criticized the amendment process itself for being too difficult to 
enact reforms.  Louis Michael Seidman dismisses it as “cumbersome,”33 while Sanford Levinson 
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laments, “Article V constitutes what may be the most important bars of our constitutional iron 
cage precisely because it works to make practically impossible needed changes in our polity.”34   
Melissa Schwartzberg contends that the existing threshold (two-thirds in both houses of 
Congress and three-quarters of state legislatures) is unduly prohibitive.  She explains, 
“Bicameralism, as many scholars have noted, is in effect a supermajoritarian device … Where it 
already exists, however, there is certainly no need to raise the threshold; it is already 
supermajoritarian enough.”35  
 To address these valid concerns, we can consider lowering the threshold for ratifying a 
constitutional amendment to 60 percent of both houses of Congress and two-thirds of state 
legislatures.  Lowering the bar may foster greater political mobilization and engagement of 
citizens, thereby further strengthening the legitimacy for constitutional mechanisms.  It could 
also serve to limit the role of the Court in that regard by offering an incentive to citizens to 
choose the political route over the legal recourse to effecting constitutional change.   
 Nonetheless, this reform would still retain consensus-building at its core.  It is not purely 
majoritarian, by any means, for it requires greater support than simple majorities.  Yet it 
minimizes the so-called “tyranny of the minority,” the notion that twelve states could hinder a 
constitutional consensus for change.   
 Reforming the amendment process must balance the dual challenges of seeking greater 
civic engagement, which may limit judicial scope, while retaining an incremental approach to 
altering the Constitution.  To reiterate, Madison had hoped a stable, long-term, and durable 
regime would instill reverence among the people, and therefore, advocated a gradual and 																																																								
34	Sanford	Levinson,	Our	Undemocratic	Constitution:	Where	the	Constitution	Goes	Wrong	(And	How	We	the	People	
Can	Correct	It),	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006),	160.		
35	Melissa	Schwartzberg,	Counting	the	Many:	The	Origins	and	Limits	of	Supermajority	Rule,	(New	York:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	2014),	186.		
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considered approach to change.36  Mark Levin’s proposal, which subjects judicial decisions to a 
veto of Congress and the state legislatures, may lose that sense of caution in its immediacy and 
regularity of action.37  It might risk unsettling the Constitution by making changes a routinized 
aspect of government.  Resolving the tension between improving accessibility and fostering 
patience requires further attention.  By researching different methods of constitutional change, 
and its effects on the regime, society, the courts, and other institutions, we could get a better idea 
of the most appropriate path forward.   
 
5.5  Society 
 The limited nature of the Constitution attests to the minimal role the Framers believed the 
national government should have in societal affairs.  Permitting the people to operate, largely 
unimpeded by the state, while quietly assuring the proper functioning of government, had been 
the success of the Constitution.  As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “In America, you see 
written laws; you see their daily execution; everything is in motion around you, and the motor is 
nowhere to be seen. The hand that runs the social machine escapes at every moment.”38  
However, the nation has become increasingly more democratic, while the state has 
expanded its capabilities and capacities to deliver services, regulate economic activity, and 
monitor society.  As such, it may become essential that citizens are well informed and educated 
on the topics of governance, namely history, civics, and politics, so as to better understand their 
nationhood, political processes, constitutional mechanisms, and so forth.  Citizens could couple 
																																																								
36	James	Madison,	“Federalist	No.	49,”	in	The	Federalist	Papers,	313-314.	
37	Mark	R.	Levin,	The	Liberty	Amendments:	Restoring	the	American	Republic,	(New	York:	Threshold	Editions,	2013),	
68-69.	
38	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	“Democracy	in	America:	Historical-Critical	Edition,	Vol.	1	[1835],”	Online	Library	of	Liberty,	
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this knowledge with a passion for engagement, getting involved with their communities, their 
states, and their nation in strengthening the foundations of the polity.  Finally, they should 
consider demonstrating responsibility.  If responsibility and maturity are to be desired among 
lawmakers, then it probably begins with its citizens, particularly by balancing immediate 
gratification and satisfaction with long-term vigilance, patience, and sacrifice.  An educated, 
active, and responsible citizenry can help to foster a vibrant polity, while assuring the continued 
stability and strength of the regime.   
 
5.6  Constitutional Discourse 
 Constitutional discourse has focused much on the inadequacies of the Constitution to 
serve contemporary Americans. However, it is important for analysts and researchers to 
reconsider the strengths of the document.  The Framers established a government deliberatively, 
and while their product represented a compromise of interests between North and South, small 
and large states, and so forth, it was also a framework with specific goals.  It might be incumbent 
upon reformers to fully consider the implications of extensive changes, before rushing to remake 
the Constitution.     
Reconsidering the Constitution could encompass a thorough reassessment of the Framers.  
They had very real concerns about majorities, both legislative and popular; governments with 
unlimited powers; and an improper balance between states and the national government.  
Analysts should determine whether these concerns remain creditable and pertinent to the 
contemporary American system.  One can make the argument that these reservations have much 
validity and that they should not be dismissed lightly.   
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Focusing on institutional development, researchers should decide the best approach to 
resolving the tension between accountable, responsive institutions which are stable and durable; 
and independent, strong branches which should be limited in scope.  Further, they should focus 
on ensuring that the regime fosters legitimacy and reverence, while strengthening societal 
cohesion, as well.   Several suggestions for reform have been proposed here, but they are by no 
means exhaustive.  In the least, they offer a first step toward addressing the problems of 
contemporary constitutional dysfunction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
